In the article published in this issue, 4 he advances a different set of views about the two cases he regards as so important. He gives us no hint about how or why he underwent his change of heart. His transformation warrants our attention, for by examining his conflicting positions, we shall come to appreciate another set of discontinuities-those that, despite Professor Weinreb's views, in fact shape the history of larceny.
I. A Guide to the Issues
Virtually all of the cases in dispute conform to the same pattern of activity. An owner voluntarily hands over his goods to D, whose stated purpose is to use them for a limited time. D might plan to return the goods to the owner, or he might plan to deliver them to a third party. At a subsequent time, as things turn out, D uses the goods in a manner inconsistent with the owner's rights. He might sell the goods to a stranger, or he might remove the contents of the package he is supposed to deliver. In any case, he converts the goods to his own use. In this course of events, it is important to note, the only time at which we can directly establish a dishonest purpose is that of the conversion. The intention of defendant at the time of receiving the goods remains obscure. Without extrinsic evidence, such as a confession or an admission, we have no way of knowing the defendant's purpose at the time of receipt.
With the enactment of statutes punishing embezzlement 5 and larceny by bailees, 6 D could readily be convicted for his dishonest appropriation of the goods while he is in possession of them. Prior to those statutory modifications of the common law, however, larceny was the only applicable crime. In deciding whether D was criminally liable, therefore, the courts and commentators faced two agonizingly difficult questions. First, was D's conduct larceny? Second, if it was larceny, when did the crime occur? To the latter question, there are two possible answers, and I shall refer to the two possible moments of criminality as T, and T.,. T, is the moment when D first acquires physical control of the goods. T., is the subsequent moment when he appropriates the goods to his own use. The following chart diagrams the events in The Carrier's Case, in The King v. Pear, and in an important hypothetical problem that I shall dub the "Clever Carrier's Case": D takes the bales to Smithfield and sells them to a third party.
We can also ascribe an outcome to the Clever Carrier's Case, even though it appears never to have been decided, for virtually every common-law commentator prior to the nineteenth century took the position that the clever carrier should not be guilty. 9 If we take these data as our starting point, we confront the additional question, when did the crime in these cases occur? At T, or at T 2 ? In the common law, the moment of criminality has always been critical. The venerable principle of concurrence, requiring a union of act and intent at one moment in time, finds its clearest application in larceny cases. In writing the Third Institute, which shaped the common law of larceny, Sir Edward Coke grasped the full significance of this required concurrence. It is worth quoting two paragraphs in full, for these lines provide the basis for nearly two centuries of thinking about larceny:
[Felonious taking.] First it must be felonious, id est, cum animo furandi [that is, with animus furandi], as hath been said. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea [no act is criminal unless accompanied by a criminal intent]. And this intent to steal must be when it cometh to his hands or possessions; for if he 7. The question whether the carrier's taking was felony was an incidental issue in the case. The question put to the justices was whether the foreign merchant could recover the goods directly from the "sheriffs of London." 64 SELDEN Soc'Y, supra note 2, at 34. All of the justices of the Exchequer Chamber except Nedeham had concluded that the taking was not felonious, id. at 32-33, and that therefore the owner should have his goods. The argument against the owner before the King's Council was that the taking was felony and that therefore the goods were forfeited as waif. The King's Council concluded, in effect, that everyone was right: the taking was felonious, but nonetheless, the rules of forfeiture should not apply to an alien who had secured a "safe conduct" from the King. A legal realist would interpret this complex of views simply as the conclusion of least resistance: the justices in effect told the "'sheriffs" that, even though the taking was felonious, they could not keep the goods. There is no evidence, in my view, to support the conclusion that economic conditions explain the holding that the taking was felonious. Compare J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 18-33 (2d ed. 1952) with G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 68-69 (1978) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as RETHINKING]. Recognizing the exception to the law of waif evidently furthered the interests of foreign merchants, but that aspect of the case has nothing to do with the law of theft.
8. This crisp account of larceny contains three important propositions, which I shall restate as applied to the above chart.
1. Larceny must occur at either T, or T.,. The thief cannot acquire possession twice, and if he acquires it at TI, he must then have the animusfurandi to be convicted of larceny. This is the principle of concurrence explained by the famous maxim requiring a mens rea to render the act an actus reus. 1 ' 2. In The Carrier's Case, larceny could not have occurred at T, for the carrier obtained the goods by "receipt," not by "taking." Therefore, the felony must have occurred at T 2 . 3. The clever carrier could not be guilty of larceny at either T, or T., for at T, he obtained the goods by "receipt," not by "taking," and at T.,, "he hath the possession of it once lawfully." 1 2
These three propositions dramatize the significance of the finding of felony on the facts of the actual Carrier's Case. If the clever carrier would not be guilty, why was the behavior of the actual carrier thought to be felony? Coke provided an answer in the paragraph immediately following the two quoted above. If the carrier "goeth away with the whole pack," he wrote, "this is no felony: but if he open the pack, and take any thing out animo furandi, this is larceny." 1 3 Thus Coke explicitly followed Chokke's opinion in The
II. Professor Weinreb's First Theory of The Carrier's Case
In the three editions of his casebook, published in 1969, 1975, and 1980 , Professor Weinreb took The Carrier's Case and The King v. Pear to be critical events in the "development" of larceny. 5 In his comments on The Carrier's Case, he adopted an explanation of the case that stands flatly at odds with the statements of Coke, Dalton, Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone. After partially reproducing the opinions of the judges," 6 the text poses a number of questions designed to undermine his distinction between the actual Carrier's Case and the hypothetical Clever Carrier's Case, where there would be no felony. What difference does it make, we are asked, whether the carrier took the contents of the bales or "sold them unopened"?' 7 The pedagogical point of this question becomes clear fifteen pages later, when the text discloses Professor Weinreb's explanation for the finding of felony on the facts of The Carrier's Case. The thesis is that prior to the nineteenth century, the case stood for the proposition that the felony occurred at T, that is, at the moment that the carrier received the bales from the foreign shipper.' 8 If that had been the law, then there could be no difference between the actual carrier and the clever carrier. Both would have been guilty. The significance of breaking bulk or of selling bales would have been merely evidentiary. Both acts would have permitted an inference of dishonest intent at T.
14. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *230; E. COKE, supra note 9, at 107-08; M. DALTON, supra note 9, at 258-59; 1 M. HALE, supra note 9, at 504-05; 1 W. HAWKINS, supra note 9, at 134.
15. See L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 355-86. Because, from the first to the third edition, there are no changes in that section of the book, reference in the text of this article is always to the third edition.
16. The most significant omission is a speech by the Chancellor saying that the applicable law was not the common law, but "the law of nature. What is Professor Weinreb's evidence for this tenuous historical claim? First, the argument relies heavily on the opinion of the Chancellor in the King's Council, 19 who reportedly said, "Felony is according to the intent, and the intent here may just as well be felony as if he had not possession."" 0 Second, the argument builds on the views of John Kelyng, an obscure Restoration figure, who did in fact believe that the felony occured at T,. Kelyng reasoned that the carrier's removing of the contents of the bale and his "disposing of them to his own Use declareth that his Intent originally was not to take the Goods upon the Agreement and Contract of the Party, but only with a Design of stealing them." 2 1 Apparently, Kelyng did not conceive of the possibility that the carrier took the goods honestly and then changed his mind. In any event, the statements of the Chancellor and of John Kelyng are the sum total of the evidence that Professor Weinreb's text offers for the apparent assumption that the common reading of The Carrier's Case prior to the nineteenth century was that the felony occurred at the time of initial receipt.
Let us look at the evidence. First, the Chancellor's opinion does not support Kelyng's theory of the case; nor does Kelyng rely on it. Note the last six words of the Chancellor's opinion: "as if he had not possession." By implication, the intent that "may be felony" is an intent to steal by one already in possession. 2 It follows that the Chancellor's argument is about the carrier's intent at the time of breaking bulk. There is no plausible way to reconcile the words "as if he had not possession" with Kelyng's belief in the relevance of the carrier's intent at the time of acquiring possession. Thus, there is no conflict between the Chancellor's view and Chokke's empha- Relying on East, Professor Weinreb apparently assumed that Kelyng had accurately stated the view that prevailed prior to the nineteenth century. Professor Weinreb's uncritical reliance on East led him to another false historical claim. His casebook teaches that "most authorities up to the time of Pear's Case" reasoned "that the carrier's deviation from the contract to carry 'determined' the bailment so that possession was restored to the merchant." 3 1 That is patently false. No one prior to East had argued that breaking bulk "determined" the bailment. 32 East cited only Hale, 3 3 whom he misinterpreted. Concurring with his predecessors, 3 4 Hale mentioned only one case of "determining the bailment," and that was the case of the carrier who, by delivering the goods to the appointed destination, terminates the bailment according to the original contract. 35 
III. Professor Weinreb's Second Theory of The Carrier's Case
Professor Weinreb is undoubtedly right in his current view that the significance of The Carrier's Case in the common law depends not on the language of the diverse opinions, but on the way in which the case came to be understood by the architects of the common law. Yet, in his review of the authorities, he appears more concerned about fencing with a straw man than with setting forth a positive thesis. He seems to think that I deny the necessity of animusfurandi in establishing common-law larceny. 36 This is a curious interpretation of my published views.
3 7 My argument is that the doctrine of breaking bulk appealed to the common-law commentators precisely because the breaking provided such good evidence of intent.
Now that he has reviewed the common-law authorities, Professor Weinreb has some difficulty affirming his original view that the carrier's felony occurred at the time of receipt. In particular, he must explain why all the commentators insisted that breaking bulk 3 1. L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 377. Professor Weinreb's play on words is nothing short of brilliant. Of course both Kelyng and Blackstone believed that, in The Carrier's Case, "the delivery did not preclude a finding of the necessary trespass." The same phrase, however, stands for two radically different propositions. For Kelyng, the delivery did not preclude a felonious taking at the time of the delivery .3 That is, Kelyng rejected Coke's basic dichotomy 40 between taking and receiving by delivery. For Blackstone, as for all his noted predecessors, 4 ' the distinction between taking and receipt represented the foundation of the common law of larceny. 4 2 Delivery precluded larceny at that moment of time. The doctrine of breaking bulk, however, permitted a finding of felony at the subsequent moment of the breaking; 43 it is in that sense, as Professor Weinreb reasons, that "delivery did not preclude a finding of the necessary trespass." Professor Weinreb's maneuver consists in obfuscating the critical distinction between larceny at T, and larceny at T.,. Yet if larceny is possible at T, as Kelyng maintained, then the clever carrier is as guilty as the carrier; 4 4 if larceny is possible only by virtue of breaking bulk at T 2 , then, as Blackstone wrote, the clever carrier is not guilty. 45 In his second eclectic maneuver, Professor Weinreb now seeks to account for the doctrine of breaking bulk by relying on Chokke's formal argument that the shipper delivered the wrappings of the bales, but not the contents.
4 6 The implication, according to Chokke, is that when the carrier "broke open" the bales, he entered upon a domain over which the shipper retained possession. This rationale now strikes Professor Weinreb as convincing. 47 Breaking bulk would appear to be the moment of felony "on the ground that Choke1 4 S himself stated, as an analogy to the earlier cases in which a trespassory taking was found despite a prior delivery. ' 49 Of course, if Chokke's argument explains why the commonlaw commentators relied on the event of "breaking," then one cannot maintain, as does Professor Weinreb's casebook, 50 that the felony occurred at the moment of receiving the bales.
IV. Two Readings of The Carrier's Case
In approaching a historical puzzle like the significance of The Carrier's Case in the common-law tradition, we should recognize, first, that the reading of the case might have shifted over time, and further, that the reading adopted by particular commentators tells us as much about them as it does about the case itself. My assumption is that the writers from Stanford to Blackstone adopted a view of The Carrier's Case that made sense to them. If the finding of the carrier's felony had struck them as inexplicable, they would simply have ignored this advisory opinion of the King's Council. That every important writer from Coke to Blackstone fastened on breaking open the bales as the moment of felony implies that this rationale of the case dovetailed with their conception of criminality.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the arguaway with him; or if I send goods by a carrier, and he carries them away; these are no larcenies.") 46. 64 SELDEN Soc'y, supra note 2, at 32 ("for here the things which were in the bale were not given to him, but the bales as chose entire were delivered ut supra to carry etc.").
47. See Weinreb, supra note 4, at 303. In his casebook, Professor Weinreb described this ground of the decision as "shaky." L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 377.
48. "Choke" is the law-French spelling for the English "Chokke." 49. Weinreb, supra note 4, at 303. This statement of Chokke's rationale is mistaken in two respects. First, there is no evidence that Chokke relied on "earlier cases"; the cases he used as analogies appear to be made up. Second, it is not true that Chokke held that there "was a taking despite a prior delivery." The whole point of Chokke's argument is that the shipper did not deliver the contents and that therefore the carrier's taking of the contents was felonious.
50. See note 20 supra.
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Reply to Weinreb ment that breaking bulk constituted the act of larceny no longer made sense. Beginning with East, 5 1 one writer after another struggled to find a new interpretation of the case. 5 2 They shifted their focus from the breaking at T 2 to the intent at T, and began to see the opening of the bales as merely one of many possible events that would evidence a felonious intent at T,. 5 3 They cast suspicion on the original understanding of the case by developing the fiction that breaking bulk "determined" the bailment.
5 4 That this shift occurred is indisputable. Coke, Dalton, Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone stand for the traditional reading. 5 5 East and Russell, with Kelyng as a precursor, represent the new reading. A shift in the reading of one case would not, in itself, engage much interest. What is important is that this shift correlates with analogous developments in the understanding of other doctrines in the law of larceny. Later, I shall return to these developments, and restate my interpretation of the general transformation in the structure of larceny.
5 7 In that context, I shall explain the relevance of the two ideal types: manifest criminality and subjective criminality. Yet we need not invoke these ideal types in order to accept the conclusion that something extraordinary happened in the history of reading The Carrier's Case.
That a major transition occurred in the history of interpreting The Carrier's Case should render less surprising the reorientation that Professor Weinreb has undergone in his thinking about the case. In his casebook, Professor Weinreb identified himself with East and the newer reading of the case. In his current article, he adopts an eclectic posture and even finds an approving word for the argument that he previously regarded as "shaky. ' The controversy about The King v. Pear, like that about The Carrier's Case, focuses on the time of felony: Did the larceny occur at T,, when Pear mounted the horse, or at T., when he sold the horse? As in the case of the carrier, there is authority to support both of the conflicting answers. The original report of the case, published in 1789, supports the finding of larceny at T 2 . 59 The later report by East, published in 1803, supports the finding of criminality at T,. 60 It should not surprise us that Professor Weinreb's original position on Pear replicates his original views on The Carrier's Case. His initial view was that both felonies occurred at T, the time of receipt.
The material on Pear in the casebook begins with a few lines from the original report, 6 1 then quotes at length from East's report of the meeting of the judges that issued in a finding of larceny.
32
East's novel thesis was that, for all cases of larceny, fraud could replace the traditional requirement of force in the taking. 6 3 The jury found that Pear had a fraudulent intent at the time of receiving the horse. 6 4 Therefore, according to East, the moment of felony was clear: Pear committed larceny at the moment he received the horse.
6 5 Professor Weinreb evidently subscribed to that position, for his casebook interprets Pear to stand for the proposition that fraud takes the place of force in the required taking. 6 East's proposition was radical. No one in the history of larceny had ever asserted that, as a general matter, a fraudulent intent constituted the animus furandi required for larceny. As I show in my comparative study of larceny, that proposition caused the commonlaw definition of larceny to diverge from the analogous crime of larceny in France and in Germany. 6 ceny must be seen as the harbinger of the near collapse in English law of the distinction between theft and fraud. 68 None of these extraordinary developments follow from Leach's report of the case, which, more modestly, treats Pear's fraud simply as a ground for refusing to recognize any transfer of possession to Pear, thus making it possible to treat the subsequent conversion as a felonious taking from possession. A line of cases and scholarly commentary takes this report as authoritative. 69 In view of the obvious discrepancies between the two reports, one can only be baffled by Professor Weinreb's inability to perceive the difference between them.
A cursory reading of the two reports reveals these differences: The report makes no reference to the stablekeeper's retaining possession. 2. Leach: The report explicitly states that the felony occurred at the time of the "conversion."
East: Neither the word "conversion" nor any synonym appears in the report or discussion. 3. Leach: The jury was asked whether, at the time of hiring, Pear had "intended to sell the horse. 7 " East:
The jury was asked whether, at the time of hiring the mare, Pear had "an intention of stealing her." East: "The jury found the prisoner guilty" (general verdict). Professor Weinreb overlooked those clear differences 76 because he was committed to the view that, in The Carrier's Case, the felony occurred at T, the moment of acquisition. In East's version of Pear, he found confirmation of what he took to be the only rational reading of both The Carrier's Case and Pear. Yet, in adjusting his reading of history to his conception of good law, he ignored the differences between the two reports, thus effacing data that are important for understanding the complexity of Anglo-American legal history.
VI. Professor Weinreb's Revised Theory of The King v. Pear
To support his view that there is no difference between the two reports of Pear, Professor Weinreb now advances a new interpretation of the case. His thesis now is that the larceny occurs at T, the time of receipt, but is not complete until T.,, the time of conversion. 77 The new thesis, in other words, seeks to merge the two versions of Pear. This claim is nothing if not novel. If Professor Weinreb now thinks it undesirable to locate the crime at the moment Pear mounts the horse, 7 8 then he should shift his reading to Leach's report. Yet he continues to rely on East, even as he asserts that a conversion is an essential condition of "larceny by trick."
East unequivocally committed himself to the view that the larceny occurs at the time of receipt if the suspect then has an "intent to steal. 79 Professor Weinreb recognizes that East was silent on the supposed requirement of a conversion, for he writes, "Far from eliminating that requirement [of conversion], East plainly took it for granted." 8 0 Yet he senses that this argument might not be persuasive. He therefore seeks some language from East that might support his theory. He argues as follows: "Discussing the facts of the case, he [East] says that 'the obtaining the possession of the mare, and afterwards disposing of her in the manner stated' was a trespass, which, accompanied by 'felonious intent at the time of obtaining the possession,' constituted larceny at common law." 8 That the obtaining the possession of the mare, and afterwards disposing of her in the manner stated, was in the construction of law such a taking as would have made the prisoner liable to an action of trespass at the suit of the owner, if he had not intended to steal her.
82
Professor Weinreb misleadingly revised this statement in two respects. First, he changed the reference from an "action of trespass" to "trespass," thus suggesting that East was talking about the "trespassory" taking required for larceny, rather than about the civil action for trespass. Second, he changed the negative "if he had not intended to steal her" to the positive "accompanied by 'felonious intent at the time of obtaining,'" thus suggesting that East was discussing the elements of larceny.
If there is no criminal intent at the time of the taking, then, of course, the actor must do something to make himself liable in a private action for trespass. "Disposing of the horse" fulfills this requirement. If that is true for the private action, East reasons, "[t]here could be no doubt but that in this case, where the felonious intent at the time of obtaining the possession was found by the jury, that it was felony by the common law." '8 3 East's reasoning contains absolutely no suggestion that "disposing of the horse" was essential in the theory of felony. A disposition was necessary for the private action of trespass, and that is why East mentioned it while discussing the private action. It was not necessary in the theory of felony, and that is why East did not mention it in that context.
In presenting evidence to support his thesis, Professor Weinreb misrepresents another important text as well. In Regina v. Brooks, 84 the court held that, even though the defendant offered to sell the goods, there was "no actual conversion of the property, and only an offer to sell . . . [T]herefore, . . . the prisoner must be acquitted." 8' 5 In the third English edition of Russell's Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, the editor, Charles Greaves, included a long footnote criticizing the rationale of Brooks. Greaves reasoned that "although no actual conversion took place, ' '8 6 the case should The fact is that the theory conceived by East, and advanced by Russell and Greaves, disposed of the requirement of conversion found in Leach's version of Pear. This modern theory eventually found its way into the Larceny Act of 1916, which treats "obtaining the possession 'by any trick' " as one of four special ways of "taking" the property of another.
8 9 There is, of course, no requirement of a conversion.
Professor Weinreb's primary concern has been to avoid admitting that there are conflicting theories of either The Carrier's Case or of The King v. Pear. He is impelled, therefore, to find a single, general formula for reconciling his earlier views with the obvious evidence of contrary readings. Abandoning his initial mistake in locating the felony at the time of receipt, he has failed in his efforts to find a synthesis of felony in the receipt and felony in the breaking, or conversion. As long as he seeks consistency across all the cases and across all periods in our history, Professor Weinreb is doomed to move from one mistaken general formula to another. 9 0
VII. Discontinuities in the History of Larceny
An interpretive theory speaks to us only if we are troubled by problematic data. If one ignores the data, as Professor Weinreb has done, then surely the interpretation will fall on covered ears. In the history of larceny, the critical data are the discontinuities between 87. Id. 88. Weinreb, supra note 4, at 308 n.75. Greaves gave an alternative argument at the end of his footnote, but Professor Weinreb ignores it. After setting forth his preferred view of the problem, Greaves continued: "It seems difficult also to see how the fact that Mr. Orbell did not intend to complete the contract could vary the effect of the prisoner's acts; the prisoner had done all on his part to complete the contract, and as against him it might well have been held that the conversion was complete." 2 W. RUSSELL, Supra note 52, at 54 n.r (emphasis added). Greaves did not argue that there was a conversion, but merely that from the perspective of the defendant's guilt, the offer to sell was as good as a conversion: an offer to sell and an actual conversion would be equally strong evidence that the defendant intended to steal at the moment of receipt.
89. Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 1(2)(i)(a). 90. In his study of larceny, Professor Weinreb does make two important points. First, he correctly stresses that the doctrine of in fraudem legis was a precursor to East's reading of Pear. See Weinreb, supra note 4, at 302 n.54. Second, he points out that Blackstone recognized that there might be cases of larceny other than the core cases of clandestine takings, and that, in those cases, the prosecution might have to rely on suspicious behavior after the taking in order to prove the animusfurandi. Id. at 300-01.
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the traditional view and the modern view. Among these are the following:
The Carrier's Case
A. 
The Relevance of Trespass
A. Traditional view: Although the common-law commentators do not always mention the requirement, the general view seems to have been that a felonious taking required a trespass in the taking.' 0 0 B. Modern view: Trespass is irrelevant. None of the cases expanding liability mentions the concept, 10 ' and the Larceny Act of 1916 refers only to "taking."' 0 2 Significantly, one finds judges relying on the requirement of trespass only in arguing against liability. Those radical discontinuities in the history of larceny are susceptible to a mode of explanation that has solid roots in social theory. 1 0 6 The traditional views in the history of larceny suggest one ideal type, pattern, or paradigm of thought; the newer views coalesce as the expression of an opposing ideal type, pattern, or paradigm.
0 7 In the concluding sections of this article, I shall de-100. The classic texts do not mention the requirement of trespass in defining the prohibited taking. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *230-31; E. COKE, supra note 9, at 107; 1 M. HALE, supra note 9, at 506. Yet I would not say that Professor Weinreb incorrectly describes the traditional conception of the crime in stating repeatedly that larceny requires a "trespassory taking." See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 4, at 297, 300. Nonetheless, it would be hard to find a judicial opinion after 1800 that affirms liability on the basis of a "tresspass" in the taking. Cf. Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 1 (defining larceny without referring to "trespass").
101 107. In my earlier effort to interpret the history of tort law, I borrowed from T. KUHN, scribe these ideal types and explain how they enable us to understand the older and newer conceptions of larceny. A few preliminary remarks might avoid the ubiquitous misunderstanding one finds in Professor Weinreb's reading of my views. This brief synopsis of the theory summarizes the fuller exposition of the argument in Rethinking Criminal Law. 10 8 First, the theory consists of an elaboration of ideal types that enables us to understand seemingly unrelated cases and doctrines in the evolution of the common law. Whether those ideal types fit the data can hardly be resolved by sending the relevant data through Lexis and counting references to "manifest criminality" and "subjective criminality." Thus, in arguing that the judges and commentators do not use those terms to explain their conclusions, Professor Weinreb misses the point. The test of the theory is whether the ideal types make sense of the radical discontinuities in the history of larceny. If they help an open-minded reader to understand what others have found obscure and mysterious, then the theory succeeds as an interpretation of the historical events. If the theory fails to illuminate the data, it fails as a theory. In neither event does the validity of the argument turn on whether others have used my language.
Second, the two ideal types, subjective and manifest criminality, represent different interpretations of the venerable maxim that a crime requires (I) an act, (2) an intent, and (3) the coincidence of the act and the intent at some moment in time.'" Nowhere in my work do I even suggest that either conception of criminality would dispense with the requirement of criminal intent. Professor Weinreb must be dueling with someone else when he argues that manifest criminality leads to a form of strict liability. My point is THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) to argue that Kuhn's concept of "paradigm" enables us to understand a major transformation in the system of tort liability.
See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. Rv. 537, 540 n.12 (1972). It now seems to me, however, that there are, at a minimum, two major differences between scientific revolutions and transformations in legal doctrine. First, a new scientific paradigm totally displaces the old; the rejected paradigm does not continually reassert itself. The "paradigm of reciprocity" and the "pattern of manifest criminality," by contrast, continue to influence doctrinal disputes. Second, scientists tend to be fully aware of the paradigms they reject and adopt. Lawyers, by contrast, function at a much lower level of selftonsciousness. For those reasons, the method of ideal types has more to contribute to legal thought than does Kuhn's theory of paradigmatic change. Those 108. RETHINKING at 115-234.
109. For further elaboration of the latent ambiguities in this maxim common to both patterns of liability, see id. at 119-22. that the two ideal types represent different interpretations of what it means to require an act and an intent. Neither ideal type dispenses with either requirement.
VIII. Subjective Criminality
As the dominant mode of thought, the conception of subjective criminality is the more accessible of the two. Under this conception, the intent to violate a protected legal interest constitutes the core of the crime. The criminal act is important, but not as evidence of what the perpetrator intended. The act might be expressly prohibited, such as "taking" the goods of another or "entering" a home with the intent to commit a felony. In the subjective theories of attempts, of treason, and of conspiracy, any act in furtherance of the criminal intent will suffice. The purpose of the act in the field of inchoate offenses is not to reveal the content of the criminal intent, but merely to demonstrate the firmness of intent. As Justice Douglas repeatedly asserted, the purpose of the act required for treason is merely to demonstrate that the "project has moved from the realm of thought into the realm of action." 1 10
If we review the modern conception of larceny, we find that all the data conform comfortably to this paradigm of criminality. The carrier's receiving the goods, Pear's mounting the horse, Middleton's walking away with the excess cash, and a finder's picking up an object when he knows how to locate the owner all represent completed acts of larceny. Although the critical question is whether the actor had the intent to steal, the act provides virtually no evidence of the actor's intent. For evidence, the prosecution would have to rely on a confession, on an admission, on the incriminating effect of prior convictions, or on conduct before or after the taking.
In the field of criminal attempts, the principle of subjective criminality finds its most striking application in the legislative trend toward punishing impossible attempts. Thus, according to a growing number of revised state criminal codes, an individual's conduct should be assessed according to the "attendant circumstances ... as he believes them to be." ' 11 If a would-be killer mistakes sugar for arsenic and puts it in an enemy's coffee, his conduct unquestion-ably constitutes attempted homicide. The act serves merely to demonstrate that the killer was serious about his purpose.
In drawing the line between preparation and attempt, the Model Penal Code hedges against permitting any "'substantial step" in furtherance of the criminal intent to satisfy the requirement of a criminal act." 2 The Code adds the requirement that the act be "strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose."' 3 This restriction has two flaws. First, it is a matter not of substance, but of evidence; therefore, it is readily replaced by other forms of evidence. Second, it is flatly inconsistent with the Code's dispensing with corroboration in the field of impossible attempts.' 1 4 It is not surprising, then, that in the reception of the Model Penal Code, the states have unhesitatingly abandoned the corroboration requirement. Of roughly twenty-five states that have revised their codes in this area, seventeen now define a criminal attempt simply as a "substantial step" in furtherance of the criminal intent. 1 1 5 Of these, only four require that the "substantial attempt" corroborate the actor's intent or purpose."' The elimination of the corroboration requirement confirms the general drift toward the subjectivist theory that intent is the critical element in a criminal attempt. There is no reason, under this theory, to insist upon the act of attempting as a form of corroborating evidence.
The theory of subjective criminality should not appear novel: it is, in fact, the reigning theory. It would hardly be interesting if it did not stand in sharp contrast to a less fashionable conception of criminality that stresses the manifest quality of the criminal act. (1)(a), (b) . 115. Among these 17, one finds an important distinction between states that require that the act actually be a "substantial step" and states that extend liability to acts that are a substantial step under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be. 
IX. Manifest Criminality
The critical implication of subjective criminality is that an act "quite innocent on its face" 117 may qualify as a criminal act. It does not matter whether mounting the horse, taking the excess cash, or putting the sugar into the coffee incriminates the actor. We trust the police to elicit other forms of evidence to establish the required intent. Confessions are good evidence, as are admissions to friends of the suspect. Prior convictions will do, as will secretive conduct after the incident. 1 1 8
The principle of manifest criminality rejects the possibility of convicting someone of larceny, burglary, treason, or attempt on the basis of an act not incriminating on its face. The requirement of a criminal act takes on a different meaning under this conception of criminal behavior: the act must permit an inference of criminal intent. This is not to say, as I have always hastened to add, that the act in any way replaces or deemphasizes the requirement of criminal intent. Although the two elements of manifest criminality are lexically ordered, this means only that the first question in analyzing liability is whether the act is of the sort that permits an inference of criminal intent. The second question is always whether, in the particular case, the evidence establishes the required intent beyond a reasonable doubt. We reach the issue of intent only if we first find a manifestly criminal act. But this ordering does not render proof of intent any less necessary for liability. 119 It is easy to state the principles of manifest criminality and equally easy to find dramatic instances in the cases. I shall begin by discussing a recent case in the field of impossible attempts, then turn to the reliance on manifest criminality in treason cases, and finally bring the discussion back to the history of larceny.
In United States v. Oviedo,' 2° the defendant had engaged in conduct that would be readily classified as a punishable attempt under the laws of most states. He had sold to an undercover agent a substance that both parties treated as heroin. It turned out, however, to be procaine hydrochloride, an uncontrolled substance. found that Oviedo had thought the substance was heroin and therefore found him guilty of attempted distribution of heroin. The framing of the issues on appeal is particularly significant. Because of the jury's finding of intent, the court of appeals took "as fact Oviedo's belief that the substance was heroin.
1 21 The sole question on appeal was whether, as a matter of law, the sale qualified as a criminal act. The court of appeals concluded that it did not, and reversed the conviction. The opinion reflects a strong commitment to the principles of manifest criminality. Note the following passages:
Thus, we demand that in order for a defendant to be guilty of a criminal attempt, the objective acts performed, without any reliance on the accompanying mens rea, mark the defendant's conduct as criminal in nature. The acts should be unique rather than so commonplace that they are engaged in by persons not in violation of the law .... . . . We cannot conclude that the objective acts of Oviedo apart from any indirect evidence of intent mark his conduct as criminal in nature. Rather, those acts are consistent with a noncriminal enterprise ....
... [H]
ere, Oviedo stated he would sell heroin and then sold procaine. Based on these objective facts, we cannot infer that he intended to do that which he said he was going to do, because he in fact did something else.
2
It might be difficult to grasp how the judges could both assume that Oviedo intended to sell heroin and decide that, "because he in fact did something else," they could not infer that he intended to sell heroin. The paradox is easily resolved by recognizing the court's implicit reliance on the distinction t 23 between a type of act and a token of the type, namely, the particular act of the defendant. This distinction helps to clarify the two stages for analyzing liability under the principle of manifest criminality. able doubt.' 2 4 Whether the act yields the required inference is a question of law, resolved by the trial judge and subject to appellate review. 2. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the particular facts of the case, the defendant had the requisite criminal intent.
If the defendant actually sold heroin to the undercover agent, the type of act would permit an inference of intent. Yet, if there was evidence that the defendant did not know the substance was heroin, the prosecution would not be able to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In Oviedo, conversely, extrinsic evidence of secretive behavior induced the jury to find that the defendant believed the substance was heroin. 125 Yet, because the type of act was ambiguous, the act was not a criminal attempt, and therefore the intent was irrelevant.
There is no denying that the principles of manifest criminality inform Oviedo and the analogous statutes and cases that insist that the attempt "unequivocally" declare the actor's purpose. 126 The same principles of criminality find clear expression in the treason cases, in which the recurrent problem is whether the alleged giving of aid and comfort to the enemy meets the constitutional threshold of an "overt act." In United States v. Robinson,' 7 Judge Learned Hand ruled that the act of traveling back and forth to Holland did not meet the constitutional test, even though there was ample extrinsic evidence of the defendant's treasonous purpose. The flaw in the alleged act was that it did "not openly manifest any treason.'
In Haupt v. United States,' 2 " the Supreme Court eventually rejected this test for treasonous acts, but not without a vigorous dissent from Justice Murphy. As the lone dissenter, Justice Murphy argued that the act requirement for treason had to be "'consistent only with a treasonable intention."' ' 30 Here, as in the field of attempts, we find indisputable evidence of judges committed to the 124. The strength of the required inference is left vague. See RE-THINKING at 232 ("The act must bespeak danger, but it may do so in varying degress.") 125. 525 F.2d 881, 882 n.4 ("the procaine was secreted inside a television set" principle of manifest criminality in setting minimum requirements for a finding of criminality. Finally, let us return to the history of larceny and see whether the requirement of an act that is incriminating on its face helps us understand the relevant data. Rather than argue that the evidence supports the thesis, I will simply list the data. 7. In Middleton and in later cases, only judges arguing against liability rely on the doctrines of delivery and trespass. 1 38
In selecting a rationale for
It does not require a great leap of imagination to find that all of those phenomena are informed by the principle that the courts should punish only incriminating takings. The historical argument, as I developed it in my earlier work, 1 39 traces the principle of manifest criminality to the private execution of thefur manifestus (manifest thief) in Roman law and analogous practices in Greek and Jewish law. The historical development, in brief, seems to have proceeded in three basic stages: first, the private execution of manifest thieves; second, the public punishment of manifest and only of manifest thieves; and third, the metamorphosis of larceny and the ascendency of the subjective theory of larceny.
There is considerable indirect evidence for the view that prior to the metamorphosis of larceny, our ancestors understood thieving as conduct with a particular outward manifestation. Why do we use the words "stealthful" and "furtive" as we do? Built into our notion of stealthful behavior is a sense of stealing as an act on the sly.
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Reply to Weinreb gardless of the intent. Keeping something under one's control could not be larceny, regardless of the intent. Yet taking goods in a manner that was unusual and suspicious-sheets from a hotel, silverware from a restaurant, a tie from a store-that was larceny.1 4 1
In many modern cases, judges have used the word "trespass" to capture the moment of clandestine or forcible behavior in a larcenous taking. 142 Thus, the dissent in Middleton spoke of trespass in objecting to the conviction of someone whose taking of excess cash from a bank teller was hardly incriminating. Similarly, the court in the case of State v. Topolewski invoked the idiom of trespass to express its intuition that excessively facilitating a taking deprived the act of precisely those qualities that could render it felonious. 143 In this brief sketch of the theory, I shall not rehearse the broader social and philosophical implications of the fall of manifest criminality and rise of subjective criminality. 44 These broader issues lie far beyond the range of the present debate in which I contend only that we cannot understand the history of larceny without elaborating conflicting conceptions of criminality. Historical understanding requires that we probe beyond Professor Weinreb's banal thesis that the law of larceny reflects "the interplay between legal doctrine and changing social perceptions."
X. Objections to Manifest Criminality
Interpretive theories never persuade everyone. Yet they rarely have the power to engender the kind of reaction we have witnessed in Professor Weinreb's article. Let me see if I can sort out his arguments against my theory. The basic move is to deny that there are any discontinuities in the history of larceny, and hence that there is any evidence in need of interpretation. The second move is to invoke a normative argument against my historical account. The normative claim is that a preoccupation with manifest criminality is dangerous, for it could lead to disregarding intent altogether. 1906) , the court's opinion never says directly that the facilitation of the taking amounted to a delivery. It hedges the argument by saying that the company's setting out of the barrels was a delivery -in practical effect." Id. at 256, 109 N.W. at 1041. For a full analysis of the rhetoric in the opinion, particularly of the significance of using the terms "'delivery," "consent," and "trespass," see RETHINKING at 70-76, 86-88.
144. For fuller elaboration, see RETHINKING at 100-02.
145. Weinreb, supra note 4, at 309. 146. Id. at 318.
The third move is to attack the coherence of manifest criminality by stressing the difficulty of resolving borderline cases. That the standard is fuzzy at the fringes suggests perhaps that no rational person would take it seriously. In any event, we should no longer urge the principle in fields like attempts. The first two objections need no longer detain us.' 47 The third move, however, raises some intriguing points. There is no doubt that one can find borderline cases of manifest larceny. But does it follow that there are no clear cases? If there are borderline cases of causation, negligence, malice, insanity, and duress, does it follow that those concepts have no core of undisputed application? In fact, of course, most of the important concepts in the law find clear application in some cases and disputed application in others.' 48 In seeking to understand the history of larceny, the important question to ask is not whether a particular person today can effectively apply the principle of manifest criminality to borderline cases. Rather, we should ask whether we can imagine others proceeding toward their decisions by responding implicitly to the principle. In order to establish that point, it seems to me, I need only demonstrate that some cases are relatively clearer instances of manifest criminality than others. If it is possible to rank cases by the degree to which conduct reveals the intent, then it is possible to begin discussing how manifestly criminal the behavior was required to be for different offenses at different stages of history. Let us consider, then, the following ordered pairs of acts:
1. It is more indicative of a treasonous purpose (A) to give an enemy agent a military map 149 than (B) to meet with an enemy agent at a restaurant. 150 2. It is more indicative of a murderous intent (A) to put an ineffective dose of poison in someone's coffee 1 5 ' than (B) to put sugar in his coffee.
3. It is more indicatiyve of an intent to commit a felony inside a house (A) to enter at night through the chimney 153 than (B) to enter during the day through the front door. 6. It is more indicative of animus furandi (A) for a suspected thief to enter a house, open a desk drawer, and remove the contents 1 5 9 than (B) for a suspected thief to remove barrels of meat left for him on the loading dock of a packing company.'
60
All that the theory of manifest criminality requires is that we are able to order those cases in that way. If we can do so, then we can consider the possibility that, upon finding the requisite intent proven beyond a reasonable doubt, some judges and commentators would favor liability for the first, more incriminating acts in each of those six pairs, but reject liability for the second, less incriminating acts. Entertaining that possibility might make one receptive to the thesis that particular doctrinal disputes respond to conceptually deeper concerns about the manifestly criminal nature of the allegedly criminal act.
Explicating the internal tensions in our present and past law requires some normative flexibility. I would never have come upon the principle of manifest criminality unless the values that it represents had some claim on me. Indeed, there is much to be said for those values. 1 6 1 Yet the metamorphosis of larceny would never have occurred unless there were persuasive considerations favoring the principles of subjective criminality. Not surprisingly, there are strong arguments for and against each conception of criminality. Though I tend to side with the principles of manifest criminality, a preference for one side is not as important as recognizing the existence of basic ideological conflict in the legal system. 162. For a strong argument against restricting the law of treason to manifestly criminal conduct, see Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 32 (1945) ("Treason-insidious and dangerous treason-is the work of the shrewd and crafty more often than of the simple and impulsive.") The same argument applies to the law of larceny and attempt. For a review of other arguments bearing on the conflict between subjective and manifest criminality, particularly in the law of attempts, see RETHINKING at 139-84.
